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A FAMILY LAW PRACTITIONER'S ROAD MAP TO
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES
PROTECTION ACT
Major Michael H. Gilbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
Members of the United States Armed Forces join and
remain in the military for a full career for a wide variety of
reasons. Patriotism and job satisfaction are two of the most
common reasons; becoming rich from military pay is not one
of the reasons. Many service members, however, do have a
financial motivation for remaining in the service for at least
twenty years: they can retire with a pension.'
Military retired or retainer pay is based upon the number
of years of creditable military service and the rank achieved by
the member.2 Upon retirement, military retired pay and bene-
fits become important components in a former member's live-
lihood.' Thus, when a military member divorces, the asset of
military retired pay can be a key point of contention.4
* Major Michael H. Gilbert, B.S. 1979, United States Air Force Academy;
MSBA 1982, Boston University; J.D. 1985, University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law; LL.M. 1991, Harvard Law School. Major Gilbert is assigned to the
Air Force General Law Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General. He
currently works as a Congressional Fellow on the staff of Senator Paul Simon
(D-IL). The author gratefully acknowledges the generous legal research assistance
provided by 2 Lt. Craig AlIton, United States Air Force Academy class of 1990.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3911-3929 (1988) (Army), 10 U.S.C. §§ 8911-8929 (1988)
(Air Force), 10 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6335 (1988) (Navy and Marine Corps).
2. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3926, 3991 (1988) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 8929 (1988) (Air
Force); 10 U.S.C. §§ 6325-6327 (1988) (Navy and Marine Corps).
3. The author recognizes that military members involved in divorce actions
may be women or men. For the sake of consistency, the author will use the male
gender to refer to the military member and the female gender to refer to the
spouse since this represents the vast majority of Uniformed Services Former
Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) cases.
4. At the time of entering the military, approximately 83% of members are
not married. At retirement, 88% of military members are married. Moreover, at
retirement, 63% of members are married to their first spouse. More than 90% of
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The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act
(USFSPA) is the federal law that governs division of military
retired pay. The USFSPA is probably the most controversial
law that impacts military members and their spouses. Since a
significant portion of military legal assistance deals with domes-
tic relations questions, civilian and military attorneys must un-
derstand the USFSPA in order to provide effective assistance
to military members and their spouses regarding divorce. The
division of military retired pay often is the most important
concern of military members involved in divorce actions, even
above issues such as child and spousal support.
When a client is the spouse of the military member, the
attorney needs to discuss the spouse's future rights regarding
military-provided medical care and other base privileges, such
as the commissary and base exchange.5 These rights, particu-
larly medical care, can be extremely important to a
middle-aged woman who perhaps has not developed a career
of her own and may have trouble obtaining ajob that provides
adequate health insurance.6 Many civilian practitioners have
great apprehension about dealing with military matters and
understanding the complexities of the military bureaucracy,
particularly in this area of the law.
Although almost all legal representation in this area will
involve an impending divorce, the USFSPA is also a concern
for a military member who is contemplating a prenuptial
agreement. The domestic relations attorney thus must be able
to explain the statutory provisions dealing with the division of
military retired pay and the retention or loss of a spouse's
other military benefits whether the client is the military mem-
divorces by active duty members occur within less than ten years of marriage
while in the military. Unifoined Services Former Spouse Protection Act: Hearings Before
the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed
Sevices, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 240 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Lt.
Gen. Donald W. Jones, U.S. Army, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
5. Commissaries are the same as grocery stores, but they normally are less
expensive and are not subject to state taxes. Base exchanges carry clothing, ap-
pliances, toys, and other items as a store and, like commissaries, often are cheap-
er than civilian stores.
6. -ligh divorce rates have contributed to the fact that more than 60% of
adults below the federal poverty line are women, the majority of whom are white.
After a divorce, a woman typically suffers a 73% drop in her standard of living
while the ex-husband's living standard rises 42%. Claudia Wallis, Onward, Women!,
TIME, Dec. 4, 1989, at 85-86.
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ber or the spouse, in any prenuptial, separation or divorce
action.
This article will examine the history of the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, the primary provi-
sions and concomitant controversies of the USFSPA, and some
of the problems and proposed revisions to the USFSPA.
II. THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES
PROTECTION ACT (USFSPA)
A. History of the USFSPA
States traditionally have had the authority to pass laws
concerning domestic relations. The right of each state to enact
the laws appropriate for people within that state's jurisdiction
was reserved by the Framers of the Constitution in the Tenth
Amendment.7 The laws of each state form a complex and di-
verse body of rights and responsibilities, which, granted the
traditional reluctance of the Supreme Court to interfere, are
within that state's discretion to alter at will.8 The only area in
which the Court has limited the states' prerogative is when the
state statutes deny individuals Constitutionally guaranteed
rights.'
Until the United States Supreme Court decided McCarty v.
McCarty' ° in 1981, states were free to consider military retired
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that
states control the laws concerning domestic relations. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890), in which the Court stated: "[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of
the States and not to the laws of the United States." Moreover, on the rare
occasion when state domestic relations law is alleged to conflict with a federal
statute, the Court has limited its review to determine whether the state law must
fail tinder the Supremacy Clause due to Congress having positively required by
direct enactment that state law be preempted. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,
77 (1904); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI.
8. See Peter Mallory, Comment, Militaty Retired Pay and Divore: Congress
Retiws McCarty v. McCarty-Is that Enough?, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271 (1983).
See also Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
572 (1979).
9. Mallory, supru note 8. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
10. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
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pay within the context of their community property laws or
their common and statutory law. Community property states
and some common law states considered military retired pay a
marital asset, which was divisible by the state court in a divorce
action." On the other hand, some common law states found
that federal preemption prohibited them from dividing mil-
itary retired pay as a marital asset.12 Other common law states
simply considered military retired pay to be the military
member's separate property and not subject to division."3
Colonel Richard J. McCarty married his wife, Patricia, in
1957 while he was a medical student. 4 After entering active
duty in the United States Army in 1959, he eventually filed for
divorce after completing approximately 18 of the 20 years of
active duty service required to receive military retirement ben-
efits.' 5 Based upon its finding that military retired pay was
part of the marital community, the California trial court award-
ed Mrs. McCarty 45% of Colonel McCarty's future monthly
military retired pay.'6 The California Supreme Court subse-
quently denied Colonel McCarty's petition for a hearing. 7
Colonel McCarty appealed to the United States Supreme Court
challenging the ruling of the California Superior Court that his
prospective military retired pay was community property and
therefore subject to division as marital property.'8
II. See Ellen L.S. Koplow, Comment, Division of Militaty Retiement Pay Upon
Divorce, 12 BALTIMORE L. REV. 73, 84-85 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 216 (1981).
15. Id. A military member must serve at least 20 years active duty service to
be eligible to retire with benefits from the military. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1988). The
amount of retired military pay is determined by a formula found in 10 U.S.C. §
3991 (1988). Moreover, military retired pay is adjusted annually for any increase in
the Consumer Price Index. 10 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1988).
16. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 218.
17. I. at 216-19.
18. Colonel McCarty argued that military retired pay is current compensation
for reduced services and not deferred compensation for active duty service. Id. at
221. The military retirement system is noncontributory and no vesting occurs until
the member actually retires. On the other hand, most private pension plans are
contributory and often vest after five years. Based upon these facts, some inter-
ested parties advocate a revision to the USFSPA requiring a marriage that encom-
passes at least ten years of creditable service in order for the state court to divide
military retired pay as property. Furthermore, unlike private sector pensions,
retired military officers continue to be subject to the Uniformed Code of Military
Justice (10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(4) (1988)) and can be recalled to active duty (10 U.S.C.
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Writing for the six member majority, Justice Blackmun
reversed the California court decision, finding that federal law
preempts a state from dividing military retired pay as marital
property regardless of whether retired pay is defined as cur-
rent or as deferred compensation. 9 The Court employed a
two-step analysis in considering the preemption issue.2° First,
the Court found that a conflict existed between California
community property law and the statutes covering military
retired pay.2' The Court then examined whether "the applica-
tion of community property principles to military retired pay
threatens grave harm to 'clear and substantial' federal inter-
ests."2 2 The Court held that division of military retired pay in
a divorce action would frustrate the two objectives of the fed-
eral military retirement system: to provide for the retired ser-
vice member and to meet the personnel management needs of
the active duty military forces.23 Furthermore, the Court not-
ed that "in no area has the Court accorded Congress greater
deference than in the conduct and control of military af-
fairs."24 Finally, the Court invited Congress to statutorily over-
rule its decision and provide a different result.
25
§ 688 (1988)).
19. The preemption doctrine is based upon the Supremacy Clause, which
states: "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2.
20. The Court relied upon the two-pronged test employed in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 578 (1979), in which it held that in a divorce action
the application of commuinity property law to a pension paid under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974 would threaten the federal interest of providing for the
economic security of retired railroad employees. Id. at 578-80. Hisquierdo was only
one of five cases prior to McCaily in which the Supreme Court invalidated state
laws governing marital community property issues. See also Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,
376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338
U.S. 655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
21. McCaay, 453 U.S. at 232.
22. Id. The second prong of the test originated in United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
23. McCaily, 453 U.S. at 232.
24. d. at 236.
25. Id. at 235-36. Writing for the three dissenting justices, Justice Rehnquist
strongly argued that the majority was misapplying and rewriting the test for pre-
emption that had been used in Hisquierdo by basing the alleged conflict with
federal law upon "vague implications from tangentially related enactments or
Congress' failure to act." Id. at 237.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court made explicit that military retired pay
was not subject to division by a state in a divorce action. The
Court did not discuss, however, the issues of the extent to
which military retired pay could be considered in determining
spousal or child support and the extent to which military re-
tired pay could be considered in equitable division of other
property.26
State courts consequently have held that McCarty does not
preclude them from considering military retired pay in estab-
lishing the amount of spousal or child support.2 The McCarty
Court distinguished between awards for support and the equi-
table distribution of property, noting that Congress provided
for garnishment of retired pay for support, but not for distri-
bution of property.2 Thus, if courts can garnish retired pay
in order to satisfy support awards, they logically are allowed to
consider them in setting the amount of spousal support.29
Although McCarty explicitly prohibits using military retired
pay as an offsetting property award in the division of property,
several state courts have considered the value of military retire-
ment in dividing marital property. The two factors that help
explain this treatment are a general perception that the result
in McCarty was not fair and the Supreme Court's failure to
explain extending the prohibition against offset awards, dis-
cussed earlier in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo.°
B. The Birth of the USESPA
The McCarty decision was strongly criticized by legal com-
mentators and by the American Bar Association.3 The criti-
cism focused on the difference between the treatment of
26. See John B. McKnight, Note, Closing the McCaily- USFSPA Window: A
Proposal for Relief from McCanfy-Era Final Judgments, 63 TEX. L. REV. 497, 506
(1984). See also infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
27. McKnight, supra note 26, at 506-07. See also Davis v. Davis, 777 S.W.2d
230 (Ky. 1989) (noting that disability pay, which is expressly excluded from the
USFSPA definition of "disposable retired or retainer pay," may be considered in
awarding spousal and child support).
28. McKnight, supra note 26, at 506-07. See McCaly, 253 U.S. at 230.
29. McKnight, supra note 26, at 507.
30. McKnight, supra note 26, at 506.
31. See McKnight, supra note 26, at 504. See also Leonard Bierman & John
Hershberger, Federal Preemption of State Family Pvpenfy Law: The Maliage of
McCaily and Ridgway, 14 PAC. L.J. 27 (1982).
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spouses of military members and other spouses and the
Court's use of federal preemption."
Within five months of the McCarty decision, Republican
Senator Roger Jepsen of Iowa introduced legislation that
would provide protection to former spouses of military mem-
bers." The legislation, known as the Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA), was designed to return
to the states the primary responsibility for determining the
character of military retired pay as marital or separate proper-
ty. During testimony before the Senate Manpower and Person-
nel Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, Senator
Jepsen stated that his bill was a direct response to the Supreme
Court ruling in McCarty. Senator Jepsen's bill was passed by
Congress, signed into law by President Reagan on September
8, 1982, and went into effect on February 1, 1983." Notwith-
standing the enactment of the USFSPA, the storm of contro-
versy has continued to grow, and no relief is in sight.
C. The Effect of the USFSPA
1. What the USFSPA Does Not Do
With enactment of the USFSPA, Congress substantially
reversed the McCarty decision by providing that each state may
determine, in accordance with state law, whether military re-
tired pay is divisible as a marital asset in a divorce action."
Many practitioners do not realize that although states have the
primary power of controlling military retired pay in divorce
actions, states must stay within parameters established by the
USFSPA. While the affirmative requirements imposed by Con-
gress through the USFSPA are paramount, the absence of key
issues is equally important to practitioners.
32. See McKnight, supra note 26, at 504-05.
33. See 127 CoNG. REC. 26,462 (1981).
34. See S. REiP. No. 502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1596-625. See also Michael E. Raabe, Comment, The Uniformed Services
Fonner Spouses' Protection Act: A Pailial Return of Power, 11 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
71, 74 (1983).
35. Retired military members have sued the United States with the claim that
the passage of the USFSPA was unconstitutional based upon a violation of the
Fifth Amendment takings clause. The plaintiffs also argued that retroactive applica-
tion of the USFSPA constituted an unconstitutional impairment of contract and
that retroactive application of the USFSPA was unduly harsh and oppressive. The
plaintiffs lost. See Fern v. United States, 908 F.2d 955 (Fed.. Cir. 1990).
1992]
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Congress did not require a division of military retired pay
in divorce actions; instead, the states once again have unbri-
dled discretion in categorizing military retired pay as marital
or separate property as they do with any private sector pension
plan.36 Currently, all states, except Alabama, consider military
retired pay to be divisible as a marital asset or part of the mari-
tal community.3 7 Alabama considers military retired pay as an
offset and as a factor in establishing support.3" Therefore,
military retired pay is not protected as purely separate prop-
erty in any jurisdiction within the United States. 9
Moreover, the USFSPA does not create an automatic enti-
tlement to a certain portion of military retired pay based upon
the length of the marriage. Instead, states can create their own
methods of division. The USFSPA allows a state court to award
the former spouse either a percentage or a specific amount of
military retired pay.4" Most court orders, however, are
phrased in terms of a percentage.4'
In calculating the percentage of military retired pay to
award a military spouse, many states use the formula of divid-
ing the total number of years of marriage while in the service
by the total number of years of creditable military service, and
then dividing this result by two.42 Under this formula if a
member has been married for 10 years while on active duty
36. Attorneys should ensure that a thorough review of state law and case
precedent is accomplished. In Rodak v. Rodak, 442 N.W.2d 489 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that all of a pension, including that
portion earned before the marriage, could be considered marital property and was
subject to equitable distribution. See Family Law Note-Unifoimed Seivices Foimer
Spouses' Protection Act Update, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 39. See also Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 578 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1990) (where the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire provides a good discussion of the philosophy of other states in holding that
military retired pay is a divisible asset in a New Hampshire divorce action).
37. See Tinsley v. Tinsley, 431 So. 2d 1304, 1307 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
38. See Underwood v. Underwood, 491 So. 2d'242 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
39. For case citations for every state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the Canal Zone, see Family Law Note-Unifoirned Services Fortner Spouses' Prvtec-
lion Act Update, ARMY LAW., June 1989, at 43-47.
40. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2)(C) (1988).
41. A court order that provides for a division of military retired pay by
means of a formula that is not readily understood or apparent on the face of the
court order will not be honored unless clarified by the court. 32 C.F.R. §
63.6(b)(8) (1990).
42. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1974), ceit. denied,
419 U.S. 825 (1974); Poe v. Poe, 711 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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and retires after 20 years of active military service, the spouse
will receive 25% of her husband's military retired pay.
2. The Ten-Year Rule and Direct Payment
Probably one of the most frequently misunderstood provi-
sions of the USFSPA, and a key area for potential malpractice,
is the direct payment provision. Former spouses can have the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) directly pay
them their court-ordered share of military retired pay if the
marriages encompassed at least ten years of creditable military
service.4" This requirement is known as the "ten-year rule,"
but is not applicable if the payment represents spousal or child
support rather than a division of marital property.44
Many military members hold the misconception that a
former spouse can receive a portion of military retired pay
only if the marriage lasted for ten years. This is not correctl
The ten-year rule only affects the former spouse's ability to ob-
tain direct payment of her court-awarded share of the
member's military retired pay on a monthly basis.45 The rule
actually is one of economics. If no time requirement existed,
the military services' administrative burden would be extraordi-
nary since courts can, and often do, award a portion of a
member's retired pay to the former spouse for marriages that
did not last ten years. In this manner, the DFAS is only re-
quired to administer direct payments in significant cases. The
brunt of ensuring payment of the former spouse's share of
military retired pay therefore is squarely placed on the former
spouse if the marriage lasted less than ten years. No additional
burden is placed on the former spouse by not having direct
payment than is placed on the former spouse with other pay-
ments.
43. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) (1988). More than 14,000 former spouses are
receiving a portion of military retired pay from a military finance center as mari-
tal property. Ninety-four percent of affected members retired after 1968. Healings,
supra note 4. Due to recent changes in the Department of Defense, the individual
military service accounting and finance centers have been combined to from the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).
44. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1) (1988).
45. State courts do not have the authority to order the military to pay the
former spouse more fiequently than on a monthly basis or to vary normal pay
and disbursement cycles. Id. § 1408(d)(3).
19921
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In order to receive direct payment from the DFAS, the
former spouse must personally serve or mail, through certified
or registered mail with return receipt, to the designated agent
for the respective service46 a certified copy of the court
order47 and a completed Department of Defense Form
2293.48 The DFAS requires that the established procedures be
followed precisely and to the letter.49 If the spouse or her
counsel does not comply with the requirements of the law and
implementing regulations, the request will be rejected and
arrearages may accrue.50 Effective service also is crucial in
that the DFAS will satisfy court orders on a first-come, first-
served basis when several court orders are served regarding a
member's retired pay."
46. See 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(b)(5) (1990) for a list of the designated agents for
each military service.
47. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) does not apply to military
retired pay. For direct payment purposes, the former spouse must submit a court
order as defined by the USFSPA; QDROs do not meet this criteria unless incor-
poratcd by reference in the divorce decree. See 10 U.S.C. '§ 140 8(a)(2) (1988).
While QDROs often are complex, a divorce decree or court order need only state
that the former spouse is awarded X% of the member's military retired pay.
Another issue can be the acceptance of a foreign divorce decree. Unless one of
the parties to the divorce is a bona fide resident of the country granting the
divorce or unless the divorce is recognized by a court of competent jurisdiction in
the United States, benefits will not be initiated or terminated based upon the de-
cree. See 55 COMP. GEN. 533 (1975); 36 COMP. GEN. 121 (1956); see also Shaft v.
United States, 695 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1983), cei. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
48. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(b)(1)(A) (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(b)(1) (1990). The
former spouse, not the attorney, should sign the DD Form 2293. Any evidence
supporting the former spouse's claim that the marriage lasted ten years will be
sufficient. Examples of adequate evidence include marriage certificates, court
records, birth certificates, and military documents.
49. lie USFSPA protects the United States and any officer or employee of
the United States fiomni liability with respect to payments made under the USFSPA
pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with the law and regulations. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(0(1) (1988). See also 32
C.F.R. § 6 3 .6 (g) (1990). Obviously if the DFAS does not comply with the USFSPA
or the regulations, the aggrieved party can sue the United States. An example of
such a violation would be if the DFAS were to begin dtirect payments to a former
spouse without having received a certified court order in accordance with 32
C.F.R. § 63.6(b)(1)(ii) (1990). See Booyer v. Van Buskirk, No. 84-4093-CV-C-5 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (federal district court granting summary judgment to plaintiff for
improper management by Air Force Accounting and Finance Center).
50. Arrearages of military retired pay based upon a division of property, as
opposed to spousal or child support, cannot be obtained through direct payment
by the military service. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
51. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(h)(4) (1988).
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As part of the application by the former spouse for direct
payment of military retired pay, the spouse must agree in her
written application that any future overpayments are recover-
able and subject to involuntary collection from the former
spouse or from her estate.52 Another condition precedent to
the DFAS making direct payments is that the spouse must
agree to notify the DFAS promptly if the operative court order
upon which payment is based is vacated, modified, or set
aside.5" Notice must be given if the former spouse has remar-
ried if the part of the payment is for spousal support.54 No-
tice of a change in eligibility for child support must be given if
part of the payment is for child support.55
If the DFAS receives conflicting court orders directing
different amounts to be paid per month to the same former
spouse from a military member's retired pay, the DFAS will
authorize payment on the court order directing payment of
the lesser amount.5" The difference in amounts will be re-
tained by the DFAS pending resolution by the court that has
jurisdiction or by agreement of the parties. 57
The DFAS can require the former spouse to provide a
certification of eligibility that attests that the former spouse
continues to be eligible to receive direct payment of military
retired pay.5" The attestation must include a notice of change
in status or circumstances that affect eligibility.59 After notice
to the former spouse, payments may be suspended or termi-
nated if the former spouse fails to comply with the requested
certification.6"
3. Jurisdiction Required by the USFSPA
In order for a state court to make a division of military
retired pay, the court must have jurisdiction over the military
member based upon one of the following: (1) domicile, (2)
52. 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(b)(l)(vi) (1990).
53. Id. § 63.6(b)(1)(vii).
54. Id.
55. id.
56. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(3)(A) (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 63.3(h)(5) (1990).
57. Id.
58. 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(h)(12) (1990).
59. Id.
60. Id.
1992]
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residence by the military member other than by military assign-
ment, or (3) consent.6 Note that this statutory requirement
only applies to division of military retired pay as marital prop-
erty. The USFSPA jurisdictional requirements do not apply to
orders for spousal or child support.62
Counsel for military members must be extremely careful
not to make any type of appearance or the court may claim
jurisdiction. Attorneys should not answer summons or service
of process if any possibility exists that the court might claim
jurisdiction. A state court could find jurisdiction based upon
even a letter opposing jurisdiction.
Remember that a state court judge is not bound by the
USFSPA jurisdictional requirements for spousal support. If the
judge is upset by an argument that the court lacks jurisdiction
to divide the military retired pay as marital property, the judge
may grant the motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdic-
tion, and then respond by ordering a larger amount of spousal
support. Accordingly, counsel should be very cautious to avoid
placing clients in a lose-lose situation.
The total amount of the member's retired pay payable by
the DFAS directly to a spouse cannot exceed 50% of the
member's disposable retired pay.6 If the member's pay is gar-
nished for spousal or child support in addition to a payment
under the USFSPA, the combined total direct payments may
not exceed 65% of the member's disposable retired pay.64
61. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4) (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(c)(6)(i) (1990). See Petters
v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 725 (Miss. 1990), in which the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi held that the state long-arm statute was overridden by the USFSPA to the
extent that Mississippi law exceeded USFSPA limitations. The dissent argued, how-
ever, that the USFSPA jurisdiction residency prong be applied based upon past
contact rather than the domicile prong, based upon the belief that congressional
intent was to prevent forum shopping in order to protect military personnel.
62. Because of this fact, a situation may occur in which the DFAS will accept
the court order for purposes of spousal or child support, but refuses to honor
the order for division of military retired pay because the USFSPA provisions were
not satisfied.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(1)(i) (1990).
64. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(4)(B) (1988). See 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1988) (waiver of
sovereign immunity that authorizes legal process against the military only for the
enforcement of spousal and child support obligations of active duty and retired
members in accordance with state law); see also 5 C.F.R. § 581 (1991) (garnish-
ment procedures for spousal or child support). See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). State
law is followed when processing garnishment requests in the areas of jurisdiction,
competency of courts, procedures, exemptions, and the operation of garnishment
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Naturally, this provision does not relieve former military mem-
bers of their liability for paying the remaining amount of
spousal support, child support, or other payments required by
court order, above the amount directly paid by the DFAS.65
If the military member was on active duty at the time an
order was issued for the military to make direct payment to
the spouse, and the member was not represented by counsel in
court, the court order or allied documents must specify that
the court complied with66 the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Re-
lief Act.67 The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act may allow
a stay of the proceedings for the military member;68 thus the
USFSPA seeks to ensure that the military member's rights were
not violated.
4. Defining "Disposable Military Retired or Retainer Pay"
One of the most controversial USFSPA parameters that
must be observed by state courts is that states may only consid-
er "disposable retired or retainer pay" in accordance with state
law in divorce actions. 6' "Disposable retired or retainer pay"
is defined by the USFSPA as the total monthly retired pay less
(1) debts owed to the United States; (2) legitimate amounts
withheld for federal, state, and local taxes; (3) government life
insurance premiums; and (4) disability pay.7 The eye of this
or similar processes. State law governing service of process and exemptions from
garnishment and similar processes, however, may be affected by federal law. See 5
C.F.R. § 581.202(d) (1991).
65. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6) (1988). See also 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1988); 5 C.F.R. §
581 (1991) (garnishment procedures for spousal or child support).
66. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(b)(1)(D) (1988). Again, this requirement does not apply
to court orders for spousal or child support.
67. 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1982).
68. 50 U.S.C. app. § 510 (1982).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988). Moreover, members may request supple-
mental federal tax withholding under 26 U.S.C. § 3402(i) (1988) when the mem-
ber presents evidence supporting such a withholding. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C)
(1988); 32 C.F.R. § 6 3.6(e)(iv) (1990). Furthermore, members may authorize volun-
tary state tax withholding from retired pay when the Uniformed Services have
entered into an agreement with the concerned state under 10 U.S.C. § 1045
(1988). See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(D) (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(iv) (1990).
70. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1988). Veterans who become disabled during
military service while in the line of duty are eligible for disability benefits. 38
U.S.C. § 310 (1988) (wartime disability); 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1988) (peacetime dis-
ability). The amount of disability that a military member will be eligible to receive
is based upon the seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the
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storm centers primarily on the exclusion of disability pay from
the definition of "disposable retired or retainer pay" and state
court jurisdiction.7' Military members normally will elect to
waive a portion of their retired pay for disability pay because
disability pay is tax-exempt.72
Until recently, many states ignored the statutory mandate
that disability pay, which is difficult to obtain, cannot be con-
sidered as part of the disposable military retired pay over
which state courts hold jurisdiction. In order to include disabil-
ity pay as disposable military retired pay, courts interpreted
the USFSPA as a vehicle by which Congress intended to return
to the states total authority to divide military retired pay, as in
the pre-McCarty era.71 Courts stretched to accomplish this re-
sult in order to avoid what they perceived would be an eco-
nomic disaster to the spouse. 4
The game changed when the United States Supreme
Court held in Mansell v. Mansell that federal law means what it
says.75 In Mansell, the Court noted that the language of the
USFSPA is "both precise and limited."76 The Court held that
member's ability to earn a living has been impaired. 38 U.S.C. §§ 314, 355 (1988).
71. A military retiree must waive his retired pay to the extent of the amount
of disability pay that he receives in order not to have an unfair windfall. See 38
U.S.C. § 3105 (1988). The portion of a member's retirement pension that is clas-
sified as disability pay is tax-exempt. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1988). Of the 1.6 mil-
lion military retirees on September 30, 1989, approximately 150,000 were not re-
ceiving milituy retired pay due to VA disability compensation or other reductions.
An additional 135,000 members were receiving disability retired pay; of these, 63%
had insufficient years of service to qualify for nondisability retirement. Overall
82% of all retired members were receiving nondisability retired pay. Heatings,
supra note 4.
72. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1988).
73. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
74. Id. at 593.
75. Id. at 594-95.
76. Id. at 588. In addition to the seemingly explicit wording of the USFSPA,
legislative history further supports the Mansell decision. See Uniforned Senvices For-
met Spouses Piutection Act: Hea7ngs on S. 1453, S. 1648, and S. 1814 Before the
Subcomm. on Manpower and Pemonnel of the Senate Comm. on Aimed Services, 97th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. i, 70- 71, 131-34, 182-84 (1982); S. REP. No. 502, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165
(1982). Notwithstanding the victory that Major Mansell enjoyed with the United
States Supreme Court, lie was not able to prevail on remand based upon several
issues, including his signing a marital property settlement agreement and res
judicata. See Mansell v. Mansell, 265 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Ct. App. 1989). See also
Manse!! v. Manselk An Epilogue, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1990, at 74-75; Elliott v. Elliott,
797 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (Texas Court of Appeals refusing to give
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state courts only have the authority to treat disposable retired
pay, as defined by federal law, as marital property.77
Since receiving the clear message of Mansell, courts appear
to have complied with the proscription of the USFSPA. 71 In-
terestingly, the state courts still may be able to circumvent the
apparent USFSPA intention that disability pay not be consid-
ered by the state courts as marital property. The method by
which this end run can be accomplished is by the state court
awarding spousal or child support or awarding other marital
property as an offset in those cases in which a perceived ineq-
uity arises based upon disability pay being the separate proper-
ty of the military member.79
Realizing that what the legislature will not do, the judicia-
ry sometimes tries to do, another possible tactic is for a court
to construe Mansell very narrowly. A court conceivably can
hold that although Mansell precludes an award of disability pay
under Chapter 11 of Title 38 of the United States Code, the
Court did not address disability payments made under Chapter
61 of Title 10.80 Chapter 61 disability payments thus arguably
can be reached by state courts for division in divorce actions.
This interpretation, however, appears to violate the mandates
of the USFSPA and flies in the face of the Mansell decision.
Military members can attempt to restrain courts from
creating their own law in this area by considering a provision
in the federal regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations
requires that in order for the former spouse to receive direct
Mansell retroactivity regarding division of gross military retirement benefits); Berry
v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court refusing to retroac-
tively apply the USFSPA definition of disposable retired pay to a Texas divorce
decree that was final prior to the enactment of the USFSPA).
77. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989). See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 777
S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1989) (Kentucky Supreme Court held that federal preemption
prevents states from holding in any inconsistent manner); Berry v. Berry, 780
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Bewley v. Bewley, 780 P.2d 596 (Idaho 1989).
78. See Andrews v. Andrews, 543 N.E.2d 31 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989); Phillips v.
Phillips, 489 So. 2d 592 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
79. Chapter 61 of Title 10 of the Uniied States Code establishes retirement
pay for physical disabilities that occur while the member is serving in the military
for members who have served at least twenty years. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1204
(1988). Chapter 11 of Title 38 of the United States Code establishes disability
compensation for illness or disease that manifests during active duty or after
completion of military service. 38 U.S.C. § 310 (1988). See also Davis v. Davis, 777
S.W.2d 230, 231 (Ky 1989).
80. See 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(a) (1990).
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payment in the case of a division of property, the court order
"must specifically provide that payment is to be made from
disposable retired pay."'" If the court order served upon the
DFAS does not contain this representation, the military mem-
ber should challenge the propriety of any direct payments
made by the DFAS. Moreover, the DFAS should verify that this
requirement is satisfied and reject flawed court orders since
they have an interest in ensuring compliance with federal fiscal
law and can be held civilly liable for such a mistake. 2
Another controversy that is beginning to form on the
horizon centers on the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)
program. In the Fiscal Year 1992 Department of Defense Au-
thorization Act, Congress approved allowing military service
departments offering an annuity or a lump-sum cash award to
certain members who volunteer to separate from the military
prior to retirement. Under the newly-created 10 U.S.C. section
1175, many members may be eligible to separate with an annu-
ity that will run for twice the amount of time they served on
active duty. Thus, a major with 13 years of service may receive
an annuity for 26 years if he voluntarily separates rather than
remains on active duty.
Military members who are contemplating a divorce, and
active duty members who already have divorced and have had
a portion of their future military retired pay awarded to their
former spouses, may decide to separate with VSI benefits in
order to avoid the USFSPA. Since VSI payments clearly are not
military retired pay, but rather merely incentive pay to sepa-
rate, the USFSPA cannot be applied to VSI payments. Mem-
bers contemplating divorce must recognize, however, that
courts can consider VSI as marital property. Divorced active
duty members must carefully examine their state laws to en-
sure former spouses cannot modify their decrees if they
choose to separate with VSI rather than remain on active duty
until retirement.
81. Id. § 63.6(a)(1).
82. The former spouse's property interest in the former military member's
military retired pay cannot be discharged through a declaration of Chapter 7
bankruptcy. See Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990); Tidwell v.
Tegtneyer, 117 Bankr. 739 (S.D. Fla. 1990); MacMeeken v. MacMeeken, 117
Bankr. 642 (Kan. 1990).
[Vol. 32
USFSPA
5. Payments to the Former Spouse
If the court awards a spouse a percentage of a member's
retired pay, that income is considered the separate property of
the spouse.8" Unlike spousal support, which normally termi-
nates upon the spouse's remarriage, or child support, which
normally terminates upon the emancipation or the attainment
of a specified age by the children, the spouse will continue to
receive the court-awarded share of military retired pay until
one of the following occurs: (1) the court order limits the peri-
od of time for the spouse to receive the military retired pay
and that time elapses; (2) the spouse dies; or (3) the military
member dies. 4
The USFSPA does not grant the former spouse a property
interest that can be devised, assigned, or transferred in any
manner.8 5 Obviously, however, if the court attempts to ignore
the dictates of Mansell by considering disability pay in estab-
lishing support payments, the court will have to design the
award to continue the payment notwithstanding events such as
remarriage.
Another point of contention is when the military member
can be ordered to begin paying a portion of his military re-
tired pay to his former spouse. The USFSPA explicitly pre-
cludes a state court from ordering a military member to retire
in order to begin payments to the former spouse. 86 Undaunt-
ed by written law, some courts nevertheless order active duty
military members to begin paying their spouses a portion of
their prospective military retired pay once the member attains
83. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1988).
84. Id. § 1408(d)(4); 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(h)(3) (1990). Former spouses who are
applicants under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
must assign all rights of support to the state child support enforcement agency.
Such an assignment is not valid for purposes of the USFSPA. The former spouse
is the only one who can apply to have direct payment initiated. 50 Fed. Reg.
2665 (1985) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 63).
85. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1988). See also 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(4) (1988);
32 C.F.R. § 63.6(h)(3) (1990).
86. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(3) (1988). See, e.g., Luciano v. Luciano, 164 Cal. Rptr.
93 (Ct. App. 1980). See also Gemma v. Gemma, 778 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1989) (Nevada
Supreme Court adopted a rule that allows Nevada courts to award a former
spouse the right to begin receiving payments, based upon a property division of a
pension, from the employee once the employee reaches retirement eligibility);
Fowter Spouses' Act Update, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1989, at 39.
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retirement eligibility, which is twenty years of creditable mili-
tary service. Thus, when military members attain twenty
years of service, even if they choose to remain on active duty
and not retire, they must begin paying their former spouses as
if they had retired.8 Realistically, this action forces members
to retire and denies the military the best ten years of a
member's career.
Payments ordered under the USFSPA must be accom-
plished through a final decree, which is defined as:
[A] decree from which no appeal may be taken or from
which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed
for taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such
appeals or a decree from which timely appeal has been
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the
laws applicable to such appeals.
9
Upon receiving effective service9" of the court order, the
DFAS has ninety days in which to begin direct payments to the
former spouse.9 The DFAS, however, only can make prospec-
tive payments; the DFAS does not have authority to pay ac-
crued arrearages through direct payment to the former
spouse.
9 2
Obviously, arrearages will be created at the beginning of
every direct payment case since effective service of the DFAS
must be accomplished, after which the DFAS has 90 days to
begin payments. The military member naturally is liable for
these payments, which sounds nice, but does not mean that all
members gladly will pay arrearages. Moreover, a spouse may
87. Besides contravening a specific provision of the USFSPA, this type of
action ignores legislative history that tried to carefully avoid this predicament. See
Unifobmed Setvices Foimer Spouses Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1453, S. 1648, and S.
1814 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Peisonnel of the Senate Comm. on Aimed
Senjices, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 1, 131-34 (1982) (questions by Senator J.
James Exon); id. at 70-71 (statement of Capt. Henry Palau on behalf of a veterans'
group); id. at 182-84 (statement of Lt. Gen. Andrew P. losue, U.S. Air Force).
88. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1) (1988).
89. Id. § 1408(a)(3).
90. Id. § 1408(b)(1).
91. If the military member is not yet entitled to retired pay, payments nor-
rally will begin within 90 days after the member is entitled to receive retired pay.
Id.
92. 32 C.F.R. § 63.6(h)(10) (1990) provides that "[p]ayments made shall be
prospective in terms of the amount stated in the court order. Arrearages will not
be considered in determining the amount payable from retired pay."
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find herself facing a recalcitrant person who will do his best to
reduce the amount of disposable retired pay in order to pre-
vent his former spouse from receiving any part of his retired
pay.
Members can reduce their disposable retired pay by creat-
ing debts to the United States."3 Retired military members
have thought of various methods by which to create debts to
the federal government, such as not paying federal income tax
or writing bad checks on military installations. A completely
legal way in which members can reduce their amount of dis-
posable retired pay, however, is to declare themselves as single
for federal income tax withholding.
The USFSPA allows the member to have military retired
pay withheld for taxes to the extent authorized "if such mem-
ber claimed all dependents to which he was entitled."94 The
statute only discusses number of dependents and is silent re-
garding declaration of marital status. Moreover, although a
spouse may be an exemption, she is not a dependent for tax
purposes. In establishing income tax withholding, a member
who remarries and has no additional children, can classify
himself as single with no dependents, thereby decreasing the
amount available as disposable military retired pay.
If the former spouse has been awarded a percentage of
the member's retired pay, she is quickly placed in an unenvi-
able position. On the other hand, if the former spouse has
been awarded a specific dollar amount, the member will have
to create real debts in order to affect the payment to the
spouse. Counsel for former spouses must consider this poten-
tial problem in deciding whether to petition the court for a
93. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C) (1988). The member also can have state taxes
withheld to the extent that he can demonstrate liability. Id.
94. One of the considerations is that unless the former spouse has the court
award a percentage of military retired pay, she will not benefit from cost of living
increases in military retired pay. See In re Bocanegra, 792 P.2d 1263, 1268-69
(Wash. App. 1990), in which the Washington Court of Appeals held that all cost
of living increases received by the former military member can be ordered to be
paid to the Former spouse, notwithstanding that the order will result in more than
50% of die disposable military retired pay being awarded to the former spouse;
the amount over 50%, the court recognized, will have to be paid directly by the
member to the former spouse rather than through the military service. Moreover,
because the cost of living increases will be net increases to the military member
that will be subject to taxation, the court stated that if this does not reflect the
actual tax rate, the member should fix it himself.
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specific dollar amount or a percentage of the member's retired
pay.0
5
A spouse who faces this problem may ask the court to
order a temporary increase in the monthly payments of retired
pay in consideration of the arrearages.96 The court order,
however, cannot create a payment to the spouse over the maxi-
mum percentage authorized to be paid under the USFSPA.
The only other possible way to receive the arrearage directly
from the DFAS is to petition the court to classify the
arrearages as spousal support, which allows the member's re-
tired pay to be garnished.
III. THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN AND THE USFSPA
A military member's retired pay terminates upon his death
unless he elects at retirement to participate in the Survivor's
Benefit Plan (SBP). In a nutshell, the SBP authorizes a tax- free
deduction from a member's monthly retired pay to purchase a
survivor annuity for the benefit of his spouse, former spouse,
or other allowed beneficiary, which will begin when the mem-
ber dies.97 The USFSPA does not prohibit a state court from
requiring a military member to elect to participate in the SBP
and to maintain his former spouse as the beneficiary. 8
Upon attaining retirement eligibility, military members are
automatically covered by SBP without cost for the remainder
of the time they serve on active duty."9 A trap for the unwary
practitioner is if an active duty military member who is retire-
95. The restriction on payment of USFSPA arrearages, located in 32 C.F.R. §
63.6(h)(10) (1990), is directed to the military services. This restriction does not
prevent an amendment of the operative court order to increase the monthly
amount payable in consideration of the accrued arrears. See 50 Fed. Reg. 2667
(1985).
96. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1455 (1988); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(F) (1988). If the
former spouse was awarded a percentage of the member's military retired pay, she
will receive less by the member participating in the SBP since the member's SBP
contributions reduce disposable military retired pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)
(1988). After Manse14 courts will find deviating from the strict definition of dispos-
able military retired pay very difficult.
97. In fact, federal law specifically authorizes the military member to elect the
former spouse as the beneficiary. 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b)(2) (1988). See also Michael
H. Gilbert, The Importance of Unique Militaiy Sutwivor Benefits in Estate Planning,
THE FED. BAR NEWS & J., Feb. 1992, at 1.
98. Id. § 1448.
99. See 10 U.S.C. § 1450(0(3) (1988).
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ment eligible has designated his spouse as the SBP beneficiary,
the member must redesignate the spouse as beneficiary within
one year of the dissolution or the SBP election of the now
former spouse will automatically lapse.' °
If the member dies while on active duty during this elec-
tion period without having designated the former spouse as
the beneficiary in accordance with court orders, the former
spouse will have priority over other claimants, such as a new
spouse, and will be considered the beneficiary of the SBP an-
nuity."' Thus, if the member had redesignated his SBP bene-
ficiary to be his new wife, contrary to court order, the former
spouse can override the member's election if the member died
during the one year election period after the divorce.'
The former spouse can protect her SBP interest by re-
questing the DFAS to make a "deemed election" by submitting
a written request to change the member's SBP from spouse
coverage to former spouse coverage and by providing a certi-
fied copy of the court order.' If neither the spouse nor the
member recertifies the SBP election in the proper fashion, the
spouse will be ineligible for SBP coverage.'0 4 The significance
of this benefit is exemplified by the fact that SBP for a colonel
(0-6) with twenty-five years of creditable military service is
worth approximately $1600.00 per month for the remainder of
the spouse's life.
If an attorney for the former spouse were to forget this
important aspect of the USFSPA and military benefits, the
spouse can petition for a modification of the divorce decree.
Such a modification or clarification can start another year dur-
ing which the former spouse can seek a "deemed election." A
mere reiteration of the neglectful court order, however, will
100. Id. § 1148(d)(3).
101. Note, however, that a former spouse only may receive one SBP annuity.
In the example provided, if the former spouse remarries prior to age 55, the SBP
annuity obtained through the divorce court order will terminate. If the former
spouse's second husband dies and she again is the SBP beneficiary, she must elect
which one of the two SBP annuities she prefers to receive. See 10 U.S.C. §
1450(b) (1988).
102. See id.
103. See id. § 1448(b).
104. Once the member ,uakes an SBP election in compliance with the court
order, the member annot change the election without evidence from the court
that such a'change is authorized. /d. § 1450(0(2) (1988).
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NOT be sufficient to obtain another year during which to cor-
rect the problem.
Based upon federal sovereignty, states do not have the
authority to order the military to initiate the SBP on behalf of
the member for the benefit of his spouse. The court therefore
should require proof of compliance if the divorce decree in-
cludes an order to maintain SBP for the benefit of the
spouse. °5
Counsel for former spouses must realize that military
members can respecify the amount of SBP coverage until the
member begins receiving retired pay."°6 Court orders thus
should specify the degree of required coverage to be main-
tained by the member. The author is not aware of any specific
cases dealing with this problem or, if any exist, how they were
resolved. One possible avenue is the Board of Corrections for
Military Records. Another avenue, of course, is to seek a pri-
vate relief bill in Congress. A final and obvious alternative is to
forget SBP, and simply require the member to maintain a life
insurance policy with the former spouse as beneficiary.
Due to changes made by Congress in the Military Survivor
Benefits Improvement Act of 1989, Congress passed a one-year
open enrollment period that begins on April 1, 1992, and will
allow the following: (1) persons not currently participating in
the SBP to elect coverage; (2) persons who are participants in
the SBP to increase coverage; and (3) persons who are partici-
pants in the SBP to elect supplemental coverage.'0° Former
spouses may be able to take advantage of this open enrollment
period to obtain revisions to past court orders.
105. Id. § 1448 (1988).
106. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-189, § 1404, 103 Stat. § 1579 (1990); Department of Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-501, § 631, 104 Stat. § 1485 (1991) (de-
laying implementation of the open enrollment period from October 1, 1991 until
April 1, 1992).
107. Current pay administration procedures treat all military retired pay as
though paid to the member. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(1)(ii) (1990),
military retired pay is considered wages for withholding purposes. Thus, withhold-
ing is mandatory and based upon allowances claimed by the member subject to
limitations imposed by the Comptroller General. See 63 CoMP. GEN. 322 (1984).
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IV. THE USFPSA AND TAx IMPLICATIONS
Federal taxes are withheld from the member's gross re-
tired pay based upon the total amount and the withholding
allowances successfully claimed by the member.'"8 The
amount payable to the former spouse for court ordered
spousal or child support or division of property is considered a
deduction from the retired pay that does not affect the
amount of tax to be withheld. No federal statute or Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulation has provisions regarding the
withholding of taxes on USFSPA direct payments because no
employer-employee relationship exists.
One of the consequent problems for former military mem-
bers is completing their tax forms. Only the member will re-
ceive a W-2 form at the end of the year; the former spouse will
not receive a W-2. The member's W-2 will show the entire
amount of retired pay paid to both the member and the for-
mer spouse. When filing taxes, the member should exclude the
amount paid to the former spouse, identify the former spouse
within the area for alimony, and provide an explanation
through a footnote. The former spouse, of course, must report
any taxable amount directly to the IRS and make estimated tax
payments when appropriate.
Former spouses in the above situation sometimes com-
plain that they should be given a credit against the member
since the member has had federal and state taxes withheld
based upon the entire amount of military retired pay.'0 9 The
former spouse has to pay income tax on the amount of retired
pay that she received from the member. At the same time,
however, the member has had the benefit of having taxes with-
held based upon the total retired pay, and now recovers some
of the withheld taxes through his tax returns. Moreover, the
member's disposable military retired pay was reduced by the
additional tax withholdings, to which he was not entitled, re-
sulting in a smaller amount of retired pay for the former
108. In opposing this argument, members can focus on the Mansell decision,
which clearly considers after-tax income. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581
(1989).
109. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,734,023 (May 22, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,723, 024
(March 6, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,651,010 (Sept. 16, 1986); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8,605,007 (Oct. 30, 1985).
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spouse if she was receiving a set percentage of the disposable
retired pay.
Recent private letter rulings of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice have indicated that former spouses may be entitled to a
refundable federal income tax credit for a portion of the taxes
withheld from military retired pay. ° Private letter rulings,
however, are only applicable to those taxpayers who requested
them and may not be used as legal precedent. Nevertheless,
private letter rulings are indicative of the likely position of the
IRS. Due to the uncertainty of this issue, the IRS has been
asked to clarify the tax laws in this area for dissemination by
the military to affected parties."'
The simple solution is for the government to issue a W-2
to the member and a W-2 to the former spouse reflecting the
amount of retired pay each has received. Although this is not
solve the problem for spouses who do not receive direct pay-
ments from the military, the suggestion will benefit many peo-
ple.
V. OTHER MILITARY BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO FORMER SPOUSES
Former spouses also may be eligible for other military
benefits such as medical care,112 commissary, post exchange
(PX), and theater privileges. If a former spouse was married to
the military member for at least twenty years during which the
member performed at least twenty years of creditable service
in determining the member's eligibility for retired pay, the
former spouse is eligible for commissary, PX, and theater privi-
leges. If the spouse remarries, the spouse loses these privileges,
but can regain them if the remarriage ends.
With respect to hospital care, former spouses, who have
been married to members for at least twenty years of credit-
able military service, are eligible for medical care at military
facilities if they certify in writing that they have no medical
coverage under an employer-sponsored health plan. If the
110. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Grant S. Green, Jr. to Senator
Sam Nunn, Congressman Les Aspin, and Mr. James J. McGovern of the IRS (Oct.
7-8, 1988). At the time of this writing, no definitive exp!anation from the IRS had
been provided.
111. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Instruction 1000.13, Enclosure 4, Attachment 1.
112. Instructors, The Judge Advocate General's School, TJAGSA Practice Notes,
ARMY LAW., June 1988, at 56.
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former spouse does not have an employer-sponsored health
plan and also is not entitled to Medicare Part A hospital insur-
ance through the Social Security Administration, the spouse is
eligible to receive benefits from the Civilian Health and Medi-
cal Program for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). Again, if
the former spouse remarries, all military medical benefits,
including CHAMPUS, are forfeited. With medical benefits,
however, once the spouse has lost them, they cannot be re-
gained.
If the spouse was married to the military member for at
least fifteen years of creditable service and the final divorce
decree was before April 1, 1985, the spouse is given the same
benefits described above for spouses who were married for
twenty years of creditable service.
If the marriage ended on or after April 1, 1985 and the
unremarried former spouse was married to the member for a
least fifteen years, but less than twenty years of creditable mili-
tary service, then all entitlements, including medical care if the
spouse is under no other health plan, will continue for two
years after the divorce or until December 31, 1988, whichever
is later. If the marriage ended on or after September 30, 1988,
the unremarried former spouse is only eligible to receive one
year medical care after the divorce, assuming the spouse has
no other health care plan; in this scenario, the spouse is not
eligible for any other privileges.
Perhaps the most critical additional benefit a former
spouse could lose is medical care. Besides being extremely
expensive, middle-aged women often have difficulty obtaining
acceptable coverage. Through negotiations between the De-
partment of Defense and the private insurance industry, Mutu-
al of Omaha has created the Uniformed Services Voluntary
Insurance Plan. The plan was designed by Mutual of Omaha
for soldiers who leave active duty prior to retirement and for
former spouses who lose their military health benefits due to
divorce."' Although the premiums for this private plan are
more expensive and the coverage is more restrictive than
CHAMPUS, the former spouse can obtain reasonable health
insurance at a group rate below that charged for a standard
individual insurance plan. Moreover, qualified persons who
113. d.
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submit timely applications will be provided insurance coverage
regardless of current health conditions.'
4
VI. CONCLUSION'
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act
generates more heated controversy than any other law impact-
ing military families. Regardless of any person's feelings, the
USFSPA is here to stay. The immediate task at hand is to en-
sure that family law practitioners understand the USFSPA in
order to provide effective assistance to military members and
their spouses. Practitioners also need to recognize and master
the complex issues involved in the USFSPA, which will affect
every military member contemplating a divorce or a prenuptial
agreement.
Regardless of this author's efforts to explain the USFSPA
and some of the practical approaches that should be consid-
ered, questions will arise as new issues in a particular case
evolve. Moreover, each service may vary slightly on some of
their internal DFAS procedures. If questions arise regarding a
service's procedures, following are the addresses and phone
numbers of the DFAS offices that handle each military service:
For the Army:
Director, DFAS-IN
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Attn: DGG
Indianapolis, IN 46249
(317) 542-2155
For the Air Force:
Director, DFAS-DE
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Attn: DGG
Denver, CO 80279-5000
(303) 370-7524
For the Navy:
Director, DFAS-CL
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
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Attn: DGG
1240 E. 9th Street
Cleveland, OH 44199-2087
(216) 522-5301
For the Marine Corps:
Director, DFAS-KC
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Attn: DGG
Kansas City, MO 64197-0001
(816) 926-7103
For the Coast Guard:
Pay and Personnel Center
444 Quincy Street
Topeka, KS 66683-3591
(913) 295-2516
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